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Abstract
We formally study Pigouvian taxation in a duopoly market in which a CSR rm interacts with a
prot maximizing rm. Unlike previous literature, we consider three di¤erent scenarios: (i) the CSR
rm acts as a consumer-friendly rm, cares for not only its prots but also consumer surplus, as a proxy
of its concern for its "stakeholders" or consumers; (ii) the CSR rm main objective is a combination
of its own prot and the environment, caring for the environmental damage produced by the market
in which it interacts; and (iii) the CSR rm is both consumer and environmental friendly. Finally, we
compare the di¤erent Pigouvian rules derived with the rst best competitive market solution and the
monopoly/duopoly second best solutions.
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1 Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is currently a common practice for large and mid-cap companies
around the world. For instance, the KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017 points out
that the vast majority (93 percent) of the worlds 250 largest companies by revenue based on the Fortune
500, now integrate nancial and non-nancial data in their annual nancial reports, indicating that they
believe CSR data is relevant for their investors1 . The Sustainable Investments Institutes research for the
year 2018 also found that 78 percent of the S&P 500 issued a sustainability report for the most recent
reporting period, most with environmental and social performance metrics2 . This point towards a current
trend in business strategy by which rms are gradually, and increasingly, adopting corporate practices that
go beyond prot-maximizing objectives, taking also into account ethical regards, community welfare and
environmental sustainability as important business habits.
Very recently in economics, the industrial organization literature has also started modelling oligopoly
markets in which some private rms, that we call here CSR rms, di¤erentiate from others by maximizing
its prot as well as a fraction of the market consumer surplus, in order to reect its consumer-friendly spirit.
Among the topics addressed by this literature we can mention: vertical supply chains (Goering, 2014 and
Brand and Grothe, 2015); horizontal products di¤erentiation (Matsumura and Ogawa, 2014 and Kopel and
Brand, 2012) and strategic tari¤ policy (Wang et al. 2012, and Liu et al. 2018). Nevertheless, there are few
works analyzing the environmental problem in this context.
The main aim of this work is to formally study Pigouvian taxation in a duopoly market in which a CSR
rm interacts with a prot maximizing rm. Unlike previous literature, we consider three potential di¤erent
scenarios; (i) the CSR rm acts as a consumer-friendly rm, cares for not only its prots but also consumer
surplus, as a proxy of its concern for its "stakeholders" or consumers; (ii) the CSR rm main objective is a
combination of its own prot and the environment, caring for the environmental damage produced by the
market in which it interacts, and (iii) the CSR rm is both consumer and environmental friendly, caring
about its prot, a share of consumer surplus and environmental damage. Previous literature typically uses
the denition of a CSR rm given by case (i), assuming that it maximizes prots plus a fraction of consumer
surplus (see Kopel and Brand, 2012 and Goering, 2014). Adding these additional cases allow us to evaluate
more recent trends in the CSR literature in which environmental concerns have also become a priority for
stakeholders and consumers (see, inter alia, Barman, 2018). As benchmark we also consider the case in which
both rms in the duopoly, the CSR rm and the other private rm, only concern about material prots. In
1See: https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/campaigns/csr/pdf/CSR_Reporting_2017.pdf.
2See: https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2018/11/2018-SP-500-Integrated-Reporting-FINAL-
November-2018-1.pd
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particular, we compare the di¤erent Pigouvian rules that we derive with the rst best competitive market
solution in which optimal tax rates equal marginal emissions damage (Pigou, 1920; Baumol, 1972) and the
monopoly (Barnett, 1980) in which optimal tax rates may be less than marginal emissions damage.
Related literature to our work includes the following. Liu, et al. (2015) investigate the impacts of com-
petition structures on rms incentives for adopting strategic environmental corporate social responsibility
(ECSR) certied by a Non-Governmental Organization. Leal et al (2018) put forward a Cournot duopoly
model with a consumer-friendly rm and study the interplay between the strategic choice of abatement
technology and the timing of governments commitment to the environmental tax policy. García et al (2018)
analyze the timing of environmental policies with a consumer-friendly rm having abatement technology and
compares two market-based regulatory instruments, tradable permits and emission tax regulations. Finally,
Xu and Lee (2018) study CSR in Cournot markets with endogenous entry and investigates the e¤ects of
CSR on environmental taxation and welfare consequences.
2 The Model
Consider a single industry made up of two polluters: one CSR rm labeled 0 and a private rm labeled 1,
which competes in quantities with homogeneous products (or perfect substitutes). Both rms have produc-
tion levels of a single product output qi, for i = 0; 1, with total output given by Q = q0 + q1 and an inverse
demand function f(Q). Both rms discharge pollution into the environment, which we denote by di, gener-
ating D(
P
di) in total external environmental damages. Let total resource costs for the pollution-generating
rm be represented by ci = c(qi; wi): where wi represents resources devoted to pollution treatment. Assume
that the rm has two ways of reducing its emissions levels di. It may either reduce output qi, or it may devote
more resources wi to the treatment of pollution once it is produced, which implies that di = d(qi; wi), for
i = 0; 1. We also consider a tax on emissions, t, which works as a tax rate per unit of pollution discharged.
Both rms prot functions are then given by:
i(qi; wi) = f(Q)qi   c(qi; wi)  d(qi; wi)t for i = 0; 1 (1)
As customary in the literature, we assume that the CSR rm, contrary to prot-maximizing private rms,
cares for not only its prots but also for a fraction of the consumer surplus, CS, as a proxy of the rms
concern on consumers. We also consider the case in which a the CSR rm also cares for the environmental
damage produced by the duopoly, D, as a proxy of the rms concern for the environment. Hence the
objective of the CSR-rm is a combination of consumers surplus, environmental damage and its own prot:
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v0 = 0 + CS   D (2)
Let the parameter  2 [0; 1] represents the fraction or percentage of total market consumer surplus that is
of concern or accrues to the socially concerned rms stakeholders. When  = 1, all consumers welfare is of
interest to this rm while, conversely, when  = 0 the rm is not consumer friendly in our model. Similarly,
the parameter  2 [0; 1] measures the degree of concern on environmental damage by the CSR rm. When
 = 1, all environmental damage is of interest to the CSR rm while, conversely, when  = 0 the rm is not
environment friendly in our setting. We assume that  and  are exogenously given. This denition of CSR
implies the CSR rm is willing to accept less prots to act in a more socially and environmentally concerned
way. In other words, in our setting CSR is purely a costly activity (see, for instance, Goering, 2014).
We dene social welfare as the di¤erence between the sum of producers and consumers surplus and any
technological external costs which are not accounted for in producers surplus.3 Particularly, in this setting
we assume that social welfare will be given by the sum of consumer surplus, CS, the prots of both rms,
0 + 1, and tax revenue T = (d0t+ d1t), minus environmental damage, D(d0 + d1) (Leal et al. 2018)
4 :
SW = CS + f(Q)(q0 + q1)  c0   c1  D(d0 + d1) (3)
Hence, the payo¤ that the CSR rm maximizes is as follows:
v0(q0; w0) = f(Q)q0   c(q0; w0)  d(q0; w0)t+ 
 Z Q
0
f(z)dz   f(Q)(Q)
!
  D(d(q0; w0) + d(q1; w1)) (4)
Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to pure strategies. Our modelling strategy is based on a
sequential two stage game. In the rst stage the regulator chooses the emissions tax (t) that maximizes
social welfare, which will be levied on the two rms. In the second stage the two rms choose their levels
of production (q) and pollution abatement (w). In this sequential game of perfect information, any stage is
a subgame and a strategy vector is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) only if it induces a Nash
equilibrium in the strategic form of every subgame. In this context, SPNE reduces to backward induction.
Denition 1 A strategy for the regulator is a tax amount t  0 and a strategy for the rms is i(qi; wi),
where i() is a mapping from the domain of t to the domain of (qi; wi). Assuming that the regulator is the
rst mover, an equilibrium of this duopoly game is then a pair (t; i (q

i ; w

i )) for i = 0; 1, such that:
3Here, a real income constant measure of consumers surplus, such as equivalent or compensating variation should be used
to be strictly correct. Nevertheless, the area under a money-income constant demand curve is a good estimate of a welfare
measure.
4Since we dene social welfare as. SW , CS + (f(Q)q0   c0   d0t) + (f(Q)q1   c1   d1t) + (d0t+ d1t) D(d0 + d1)
we can notice that taxes are merely income transfers from the rms to the government, and therefore, they are canceled out.
3
i. SW (t; i (q

i ; w

i ))  SW (t; 

i (q

i ; w

i ));8t  0; i = 0; 1 ;
ii. 1(

1(q

1 ; w

1))  1(1(q1; w1));8q1  0; w1  0; and
iii. v0(

0(q

0 ; w

0))  v0(i(q0; w0));8q0  0; w0  0
In other words, an equilibrium in this game imposes that: (i) the strategy of the rms be a single-valued
selection from their best-response correspondences for qi and wi given a tax t; and (ii) the regulator chooses
a tax that maximizes the social welfare function given the optimal strategy of the rms (qi ; w

i )for i = 0; 1.
Hence, we start our analysis with stage two, in which the private and public rms must choose their
production (q0; q1) and abatement (w0; w1) levels, given a tax, t, dened by the regulator in stage 1. Thus,
the associated optimization problem faced by the private rm in this stage is given by:
max
q1;w1
1(q1; w1) = f(Q)q1   c(q1; w1)  d(q1; w1)t (5)
Similarly, for the CSR rm the problem becomes:
max
q0;w0
v0(q0; w0) = f(Q)q0   c(q0; w0)  d(q0; w0)t+ 
 Z Q
0
f(z)dz   f(Q)(Q)
!
  D(d(q0; w0) + d(q1; w1))
(6)
We denote the set of equilibria in this stage by S2 and its typical element by the strategy prole: S2 =
f(q0(t); w

0(t)); (q

1(t); w

1(t))g. Now with S2 the regulator in the rst stage chooses the tax rate per unit of
emissions discharged, t, that maximizes the social welfare function, see (3):
max
t
SW =
Z Q
0
f(z)dz   c(q0(t); w

0(t))  c(q

1(t); w

1(t)) D(d(q

0(t); w

0(t)) + d(q

1(t); w

1(t))) (7)
Likewise, S1 identies equilibria in this stage given by (t
). We assume the following very general
conditions:
Assumption 1 The inverse demand function f(Q) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, with f 0(Q) < 0
(whenever f(Q) > 0) and limQ!1 f(Q) = 0.
Assumption 2 Cost functions ci = c(qi; wi)(for i = 0; 1) are increasing and twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable.
Assumption 3 The emission level functions di = d(qi; wi) (for i = 0; 1) and the environmental damage
function D(d0+d1); are increasing in production and decreasing in abatement e¤ort, and twice continuously
di¤erentiable.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, both rms action sets are compact since the rms would never produce
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quantities larger than some upper-bound. Assumption 3 is consistent with the fact that most of the literature
denes environmental damage as monotonically increasing in production and decreasing in abatement e¤ort.
3 Results
From solving the Nash Equilibrium of the second stage we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1 Assuming that in the rst stage of the game, the CSR rm and the other private rm view t as
a parameter, we get the following rst-order conditions for the prot maximization of (6) and (5), which
implicitly dene the strategy prole S2 = f(q

0(t); w

0(t)); (q

1(t); w

1(t))g: (i) f(Q
)+ q0
@f(Q)
@q1
 
@c0
@q0
  t
@d0
@q1
+
f(Q)@Q

@q0
  @D
@d0
@d0
@q0
= 0; (ii) f(Q)@Q

@w0
 
@c0
@w0
 t
@d0
@w0
  @D
@d0
@d0
@w0
= 0 ; (iii) f(Q)+q1
@f(Q)
@q1
 
@c1
@q1
 t
@d1
@q1
=
0; (iv)  
@c1
@w1
  t
@d1
@w1
= 0.
Let us now focus on the rst stage of the game, in which the regulator faces the problem pointed out in
(7), which after totally di¤erentiating SW leads to the following FOC:
f(Q)@Q

@t
 
h
@c0
@q0
dq0
dt
+
@c0
@w0
dw0
dt
i
 
h
@c1
@q1
dq1
dt
+
@c1
@w1
dw1
dt
i
= @D
@d0
h
@d0
@q0
dq0
dt
+
@d0
@w0
dw0
dt
i
+ @D
@d1
h
@d1
@q1
dq1
dt
+
@d1
@w1
dw1
dt
i
Combining the FOC equation of the regulator with the ones highlighted in Lemma 1, and after rearranging
terms, we obtain:

t 
@D
@d0
(1  )

@d0
@t

+

t 
@D
@d1

@d1
@t

=
@f(Q)
@q0
dq0
dt
(q0   Q) + q1
dq1
dt
@f(Q)
@q1
(8)
Where
@d0
@t
= @d0
@q0
dq0
dt
+ @d0
@w0
dw0
dt
and
@d1
@t
= @d1
@q1
dq1
dt
+ @d1
@w1
dw1
dt
,which are the equilibrium emissions levels:
d{(q
(t); w(t)), (for i = 0; 1), after totally di¤erentiating them with respect to t.
While the equation in (8) is not an explicit solution for t, because t is on both sides of the equation,
Lemma 1 allows us to write q and w as functions of t. Substituting these terms into (8) then gives one
equation with one unknown, t.
Given (8), assuming that Assumptions 13 are satised and that in equilibrium the outcomes of the two
rms are symmetric, i.e., q0 = q1 = q
 and w0 = w1 = w
 we can now characterize the equilibrium in order
to show some of the main results of the model exploiting some corner solutions.
First, we present the case in which both rms in the duopoly have only a prot maximizing objective,
not taking into account the consumers nor the environment in their decisions, namely: v0 = 0 and 1. We
will use this result as our main benchmark in the discussion of main results.
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Proposition 1 The equilibrium welfare-maximizing tax when both rms in the duopoly only concern about
material prots (i.e.  = 0 and  = 0), becomes:
t =
@D
@d
+
q
@f(Q)
@q
dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d

@w
dw
dt
(9)
From the right hand side of (9) and using the fact that q @f(Q
)
@q
dq
dt
=   f(Q
)

dq
dt
we can obtain the
following expression for the optimal tax: t = @D

@d
 
f(Q)

dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d

@w
dw
dt
, which is dependent upon the price
elasticity of demand  (with negative sign). Clearly whenever  ! 1 then t = @D

@d
, that is, as demand
becomes perfectly elastic the optimal tax rate approaches marginal external damages. Nevertheless, whenever
 is nite, it can be note that the amount by which optimal tax rates fall short of marginal damages may
increase as price elasticity of demand for the polluters produce decreases, which in this case necessarily
implies that a tax rate less than marginal external damages is obtained. The reason behind this result lies
in the trade-o¤ between the environmental negative externality and the welfare loss associated with the
duopoly restricted output, which necessarily requires that the optimal second best tax rate must be less
than marginal emissions. Thus, qualitatively, the optimal tax for this private duopoly developed here has
the same structure as in the Pigouvian tax rule under monopoly put forward by Barnett (1980). Obviously,
other things equal, the duopoly output is greater than the monopoly one, so the Pigouvian tax rule under
this setting should be closer to environmental damage than the one obtained for a monopoly. In any case,
given the typical assumptions made by the literature namely: dq

dt
< 0 and dw

dt
> 0, which imply that the
denominator of the second term, i.e. the e¤ect of the tax on the private rms emissions, is negative @d

@t
< 0.
This, in turn, ensures that in this case the Pigouvian tax rule is less than the marginal emissions damage.
Second, we examine the case in which the objective of the CSR-rm is a combination of consumers
surplus, and its own prot, that is: v0 = 0 + CS.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium welfare-maximizing tax for the duopoly when the CSR rm only cares about
consumers, and not about the environment (i.e.  > 0 and  = 0), becomes:
t =
@D
@d
+
(1  ) q @f(Q
)
@q
dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d
@w
dw
dt
(10)
From the second term of the right hand side of (10), we can also obtain a Pigouvian tax rule depending on
the demand price elasticity , that is: t = @D
@d
 
(1 )
f(Q)

dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d
@w
dw
dt
. From this expression, if  = 1, we obtain
t = @D

@d
that is the optimal tax rates equal marginal emissions damage. Similarly, if  ! 1, we also get:
t = @D

@d
. Finally if  < 1 and assuming dq

dt
< 0,dw

dt
> 0 and @d

@t
< 0, we have that
(1 )q
@f(Q)
@q
dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d
@w
dw
dt
< 0
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which implies that t < @D

@d
and so the optimal tax rates are less than marginal emissions damage. Hence,
we can further infer the following results:
Corollary 1 Given the Pigouvian tax rule obtained for a CSR rm that only cares about consumers and
not about the environment, (10), we conclude the following:
a. Whenever all consumers welfare is of interest to the CSR rm, we recover the Pigouvian tax for perfect
competition in which optimal tax rates equal marginal emissions damage
b. Whenever the demand is perfectly elastic, we also recover the Pigouvian tax for perfect competition in
which optimal tax rates equal marginal emissions damage
c. Whenever only a portion of the consumers welfare is of interest to the CSR rm, we obtain a Pigouvian
tax rule in which optimal tax rates are less than marginal emissions damage.
The result highlighted in Corollary 1 a) can be explained by the fact that as the CSR rm cares for
all consumers welfare, its production level will be higher than the one under the private duopoly studied
in Proposition 1. This will compensate for the welfare loss associated with the private duopoly restricted
output and so the optimal tax rule in this case will equal environmental damage, recovering the competitive
market Pigouvian tax. Similarly, Corollary 1 b) captures the result rst put forward by Barnett (1980)
that as demand approaches the perfectly elastic state the value of the optimal tax rate approaches marginal
external damages. By contrast, Corollary 1 c) reects the fact that whenever the CSR rm cares for only a
part of the consumers surplus and hence its relatively greater output than the one obtained in the previous
case is not enough to compensate for the welfare loss associated with the private rm restricted output. This
in turn implies an optimal tax rate lower than the marginal emissions.
Third, we analyze the case of a CSR-rm that maximizes its material prot minus the environmental
damage produced by the duopoly, that is: v0 = 0   D:
Proposition 3 The equilibrium welfare-maximizing tax for the duopoly when the CSR rm only cares about
the environment, and not about consumers (i.e.  > 0 and  = 0), becomes:
t =
(2  )
2
@D
@d
+
q
@f(Q)
@q
dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d

@w
dw
dt
(11)
To ease the interpretation of (11), we get the Pigouvian tax rule as a function of the demand price
elasticity , that is: t = (2 )2
@D
@d
 
f(Q)

dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d

@w
dw
dt
. As  > 0, we have in this setting that even if  = 1,
that is, all environmental damage is of interest to the CSR rm we would obtain: t = 12
@D
@d
 
f(Q)

dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d

@w
dw
dt
,
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which assuming dq

dt
< 0,dw

dt
> 0 and @d

@t
< 0, implies that t < @D

@d
, i.e. optimal tax rates will always be
less than marginal emissions damage. In fact, even if the demand is perfectly elastic,  !1, and  = 1 we
would obtain: t = 12
@D
@d
, that is: the optimal tax rate is half the marginal emissions damage.
We state these results in the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 Given the Pigouvian tax rule obtained for a CSR rm that only cares about the environment
and not about consumers (11), we conclude the following:
a. Whenever, the CSR rm is fully committed to the environment, i.e. all environmental damage is of
interest to the CSR rm, we obtain that optimal tax rates will always be less than marginal emissions
damage.
b. Whenever the demand is perfectly elastic, and the CSR rm is fully committed to the environment the
optimal tax rate is half the marginal emissions damage.
The rationale behind this result is that when the CSR rm cares only for the environment, its production
level will be too low and that therefore the optimal trade-o¤ between the environmental negative externality
and the welfare loss associated with restricted output will necessarily require a tax rate less than marginal
external damages.
Finally, we consider the case of a consumer-environment friendly CSR rm, where v0 = 0 + CS   D.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium welfare-maximizing tax for the duopoly when the CSR rm cares about
consumers and the environment, (i.e.  > 0 and  > 0), becomes:
t =
(2  )
2
@D
@d
+
(1  ) q @f(Q
)
@q
dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d

@w
dw
dt
(12)
From (12), we get the following Pigouvian tax rule as a function of the demand price elasticity , that is:
t = (2 )2
@D
@d
 
(1 )
f(Q)

dq
dt
@d
@q
dq
dt
+ @d
@w
dw
dt
. From this expression, it is easily seen that when the CSR rm cares for
all consumers welfare, i.e.  = 1, and for all environmental damage, i.e.  = 1, we obtain: t = 12
@D
@d
, which
implies that the optimal tax rate is half the marginal emissions damage. Interestingly, in stark contrast with
Barnett (1980), even if  !1, that is the demand is perfectly elastic, we obtain that: t = (2 )2
@D
@d
, which
given that  2 [0; 1] implies an optimal tax rate lower than marginal emissions damage. In fact, assuming
also that  = 1 we get that the optimal tax rate is half the marginal emissions damage.
For this case, we put forward the following additional remarks:
Corollary 3 Given the Pigouvian tax rule obtained for a CSR rm that cares about consumers and the
environment (12), we can infer the following results:
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a. Whenever, the CSR rm is fully committed to consumers and to the environment, we obtain that the
optimal tax rate is half the marginal emissions damage.
b. Whenever the demand is perfectly elastic, we obtain an optimal tax rate lower than marginal emissions
damage. This result still holds even when we also assume that the CSR rm is fully committed to the
environment, i.e. all environmental damage is of interest to the CSR rm, here we obtain the result
from (a) in which the optimal tax rate is half the marginal emissions damage.
From the results put forward in Corollary 3 we gather that when the CSR rm is fully committed to
consumers and the environment, even though the demand is perfectly elastic the optimal tax rate will not
be equal to the marginal external damages.
4 Conclusions
We formally study Pigouvian taxation in a duopoly market in which a CSR rm interacts with a prot
maximizing rm. We obtained the following results.
First, for a CSR rm that only cares about consumers and not about the environment optimal tax
rates equals marginal emissions damage whenever all consumers welfare is of interest to the CSR rm. By
contrast, when only a portion of the consumers welfare is of interest to the CSR rm, optimal tax rates are
less than marginal emissions damage.
Second, for a CSR rm that only cares about the environment and not about consumers, optimal tax
rates are less than marginal emissions damage whenever the CSR rm is fully committed to the environment.
Besides, when the demand is perfectly elastic, and the CSR rm is also fully committed to the environment
the optimal tax rate is half the marginal emissions damage.
Finally, for a CSR rm that cares about consumers and the environment the optimal tax rate is half the
marginal emissions damage when the CSR rm is fully committed to consumers and to the environment.
Moreover, we obtain an optimal tax rate lower than marginal emissions damage when the demand is perfectly
elastic. This result still holds even when we also assume that the CSR rm is fully committed to the
environment here the optimal tax rate is half the marginal emissions damage.
In terms of policy recommendations, this analysis calls for discriminatory taxes depending on the mo-
tivations of the CSR rms. A potential way to implement this policy would be through reporting and
certication of CSR practices. This provides an avenue for future research on the subject.
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